

EXAMINING LEVERAGE IN CIVIL WAR MEDIATION: A DYNAMIC THEORY OF MEDIATOR LEVERAGE

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ABSTRACT

LINDSAY REID: Examining Leverage in Civil War Mediation: A Dynamic Theory of Mediator Leverage
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi.)

How does leverage vary across different mediator types and what influence does this have on mediation outcomes? Extant literature has glossed over the meaning of leverage, treating it as a static measure of material power. I argue that leverage is a dynamic concept comprised of two dimensions: capability and credibility. Capability leverage is a function of economic and military might while credibility leverage derives its influence from material, historical, religious, and cultural ties. I hypothesize that mediators with capability leverage will be more likely to achieve short-term success in the form of a negotiated settlement while mediators with credibility leverage will be more likely to achieve a more durable peace. I test my hypotheses using the universe of civil war mediation attempts from 1989-2006. My results suggest that capability leverage does indeed contribute to the achievement of a settlement while credibility leverage leads to more durable outcomes.

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Introduction

Civil wars are more deadly and more durable than interstate conflicts. Given their intensity, policymakers and scholars alike have been struggling to find ways to mitigate the deadly effects of civil war. A common strategy in the quest to resolve conflict is the use of third-party mediation. Mediation's effects on civil conflict, however, have been mixed. Countless war torn countries, such as Sudan and Rwanda, have experienced numerous mediation attempts, only to see war resume soon after. To account for variations in mediation success, scholars such as Beardsley (2011) have considered the effects that different mediation strategies have on mediation outcomes. How do different mediators, and their respective mediation styles, influence the mediation process? More specifically, though, I seek to explore how leverage varies across different mediator types and what role this has on mediation outcomes.

Why is the study of mediation leverage important within the broader study of civil war resolution? First and foremost, scholars have glossed over the meaning of leverage within the mediation context, equating the concept with material power. By treating leverage as a fairly static concept, however, existing studies have not fully conceptualized the dynamic roles that different mediators might play in civil war mediation. Second, unpacking the meaning of leverage is important insofar as it will help the international community gain a better understanding of which strategies are and are not successful for reaching peaceful settlements. Not all mediators are created equally; each has a unique tool to bring to the mediation process. This study, then, builds a dynamic conception of leverage in order to capture more nuanced determinants of mediation success.

In what follows, I develop a theory of mediation leverage that contains two fundamental components: capability and credibility. Capability leverage captures the extent

to which mediators can use economic and military strength to coerce a negotiated settlement. In other words, capability leverage involves the use of carrots and sticks to alter the bargaining range and overcome commitment problems. Credibility leverage, on the other hand, refers to a mediator's historical, material, and cultural ties to the parties within a conflict. If a mediator has credibility leverage within a specific mediation attempt, they will tend to have a strong rapport with the actors involved. The mediator therefore will be able to use commitment and information mechanisms to shape the mediation process. I hypothesize that capability leverage increases the likelihood of achieving short-term success in the form of a negotiated settlement while credibility leverage leads to a more durable peace following a civil war.

In the following section, I discuss the role leverage has played in existing conflict mediation literature. Importantly, I highlight how leverage has been predominantly treated as a static concept. I then move to a presentation of my theory about the dynamic nature of leverage, and I consider the role that the components of leverage play on mediation outcomes. Then, I test my hypotheses using all civil war mediation attempts from 1989 through 2006 as reported in the Civil War Mediation dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011). I find general support for my expectations; capability leverage increases the likelihood of achieving a settlement, while credibility leverage increases the duration of peace following a civil war. Finally, I conclude with a number of policy implications and ideas for future research.

Leverage in Conflict Mediation

A better comprehension of leverage is crucial to achieving a more complete picture of civil war mediation. While the term leverage is used frequently throughout the literature, its meaning remains ambiguous. According to its usage in the literature, mediators with “leverage” have the force necessary to successfully mediate conflicts. What in practice, though, does this mean? Rather than accepting leverage as an understood yet undefined concept, I seek to unpack its meaning. If leverage truly is a key to mediator

success, then it is crucial to understand what leverage is and how mediators use it to alter the mediation process.

Below, I provide an overview of existing mediation research. Particularly, I focus on discussions of mediation strategies and mediator types. Mediation strategies and the actors involved in mediation are very diverse; a one-size-fits-all strategy for mediation success does not exist. Moreover, there has been a lack of adequate attention to mediator leverage within these works. Leverage is not a static measure of a mediator's material or military might but rather, it is a dynamic concept that is comprised of a diverse array of mediator strategies. Giving attention to a discussion of mediation strategies and the ambiguous usage of leverage, then, serves as a foundation to the theoretical development of dynamic mediator leverage that follows.

Diverse Mediation Strategies

While mediation efforts include a broad spectrum of activities, mediation strategies can be divided into two broad categories. The first of these categories includes a range of low- or minimal-intervention strategies. The second category of mediation strategies involves a greater degree of intervention and force. Variation in mediation strategies is expected to have observable implications on the style and outcome of the mediation itself.

At the low-intervention end of the mediation continuum, Bercovitch and Houston (2000) describe communication-facilitation strategies. For these strategies, mediators adopt a more “passive role, channeling information to the parties, facilitating cooperation” but exerting little formal control over mediation (175). By enabling cooperation and communication, these mediation strategies act as “confidence” or “trust” mediators, two terms that Svensson (2007*b*) uses to denote pure mediation strategies. Pure mediators lack both resources and specific interests in conflicts (232). Svensson (2007*b*) cites Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994) in stating that pure mediators instead follow a strategy that “tries to get confidence of the parties, avoid participants’ loss of image, enhance communication, and build social ties among the parties.”

Beardsley (2009; 2011) categorizes mediators at the low-intervention end of the spectrum as “weak mediators.” Weak mediators are confined to light mediation, or mediation without leverage. While this does not make the mediation ineffective per se, it greatly limits the range of the mediator’s actions (2011). Beardsley (2009) writes that weak mediators have “limited faculties” (274). This makes them an attractive option for belligerent parties who want to stall the peace process; weak mediators, in this framework, have no means of pressuring combatants to come to an agreement.

In contrast to passive or low-intervention forms of mediation, mediation strategies at the other end of the spectrum utilize much more force. According to Bercovitch and Houston (2000), the highest form of intervention is that of directive strategies; these affect the content and substance of bargaining, often involve ultimatums, and directly alter the way issues are framed. Beardsley (2009; 2011) refers to directive or manipulative strategies as heavy mediation and states that only “strong” mediators are able to pursue such strategies. Strong mediators have leverage and are able to use carrots and sticks to directly alter the costs of conflict and benefits of cooperation.

In a similar vein, Svensson (2007*b*) dichotomizes mediation strategies as well. Power mediators have resources and/or interests that invest them more fully in the conflict. More specifically, a power mediator “uses its economic, military, and political resources to pull or push the parties in their preferred direction, takes measures in order to secure its own interests in the country of the conflict, and exercises its leverage over the parties in order to make them comply” (Svensson 2007*b*, 230). Again, within this framework mediators who are powerful or strong wield leverage and thus, they are able to coerce an agreement between the warring parties.

What benefits does the use of mediation with leverage bring? In other words, why do many mediators pursue directive strategies or heavy mediation? Beardsley (2009) highlights four benefits of pursuing a mediation strategy with leverage. First, such a strategy alters the costs of the conflict, or more specifically, the costs of continuing the conflict. Additionally, mediation with leverage increases the benefits of cooperation, shapes the post-agreement environment through monitoring and enforcement, and

helps to overcome information asymmetries. The heavy mediation strategy, however, is based on the assumption that leverage and resources are virtually synonymous. Of course, Beardsley is not alone in equating leverage with resources. Nevertheless, a more nuanced conception of mediator leverage is needed to better understand what the term means, how mediators use it, and what benefits it carries. In the theoretical framework discussed later, I explicate why traditional uses of leverage are suboptimal and how they limit the understanding of conflict mediation.

Who Does What: Examining the Choice of Mediation Strategy

Mediators are a diverse crowd, ranging from great powers to international and non-governmental organizations to individuals. Each type of mediator brings a unique set of skills to the mediation process. How does mediator type influence mediation strategies? Svensson (2007*b*), for example, states that power mediators, or those with resources and leverage, are comprised of great powers, regional powers, colonial powers, and neighboring states. Pure mediators, or those without leverage or interests in the conflict, are assumed to be international, regional, and non-governmental organizations, individuals, and distant states. Svensson's categorization of mediators and their respective strategies, however, is based on assumption rather than systematic empirical tests. Such assumptions are endemic in extant literature. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) write that larger states and the United Nations have leverage in mediation thus they are more effective at managing intense conflicts. Beardsley (2011) indicates, "individuals, NGOs, and small states are obvious examples of third parties that are typically unable to achieve enough leverage to make much of a difference in shaping incentives relative to the stakes of the conflict" (101).

While the above categorizations of mediators and their strategies may be accurate, they are lacking in two key dimensions. First, the categorizations are based on seemingly correlational assumptions. Rather than remaining content with such assumptions, however, it is crucial to understand more fully the dynamics behind different mediators' behavior. In other words, why is it assumed that organizations and smaller states are

weak or without leverage? Second, the existing categorizations are based on a thin conception of leverage. They are thus missing the dynamic dimensions of leverage and the ways in which different mediators may exert different types of leverage over the mediation process. By treating leverage as static, existing theories infer that large states, for example, have leverage over all conflicts and that organizations do not have leverage in any conflict. A dynamic theory of leverage, though, will create a more context-dependent theory about mediators and their effectiveness. I delve into this second idea in more detail in the theory section.

Brushing Over Leverage

The widespread assumption across the mediation and bargaining literature is that leverage is a function of resources and force or an actor's ability to use carrots and sticks to coerce others. For example, Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991) treat leverage as synonymous to resources and mediator power. Svensson (2007*b*) uses leverage to describe the ability of power mediators, immediately equating leverage to the economic, military, and political resources that these mediators have. Kleiboer (1996) notes the ambiguity attached to the use of leverage in studies of mediation. She writes that leverage makes for "fuzzy conceptualizations" and remains "one of the most elusive elements of mediation" (371). Kleiboer highlights that few researchers bother to define what they mean by leverage. The assumption is that leverage refers "to a mediator's ability to put pressure on one or both of the conflicting parties" (371). Treating leverage as a universally understood yet empirically undefined concept, however, risks ignoring crucial aspects of conflict mediation. If leverage is an instrumental variable in conflict mediation yet its usage remains unclear, how can scholars really know how it influences the mediation process?

Zartman and Touval (1985) indicate that leverage is indeed a dynamic topic. They define leverage as the ability to add "arguments and inducements that make unattractive proposals look attractive" (40). More specifically, however, Zartman and Touval explain that leverage in mediation is drawn from three sources. First, leverage is derived from

the belligerent parties need for a solution. In other words, “The greater the parties’ perceived need, the greater the mediator’s leverage” (41). Second, leverage depends on the warring parties’ susceptibility to the shifting weight that the mediator can apply. Lastly, leverage arises from the belligerents’ interest in side payments that the mediator can offer or withhold (carrots and sticks). While Zartman and Touval explore leverage more thoroughly than other mediation research, their analysis leaves many questions unanswered. How and why do certain mediators have leverage while others do not? Moreover, Zartman and Touval examine leverage from the demand side, or from the side of the belligerent parties. What attributes of the mediators themselves contribute to leverage?

Beardsley (2008) is the most recent to bring leverage back in to mediation research. He hints at a more complex vision of leverage in discussing tangible versus intangible leverage. Tangible leverage encompasses the assumed dimensions of leverage including resources and carrots and sticks. Intangible leverage, on the other hand, refers to a mediator’s ability to make promises or use prestige to mediate. Nevertheless, Beardsley (2009) slips back to the equation of leverage with resources. With that being said, little has been done to delve theoretically or empirically into the multiple dimensions of leverage. Brushing over leverage remains a problem because, as aforementioned, it ignores the contextual variations of leverage and prevents scholars from gaining a more nuanced understanding of what does and does not work in conflict mediation.

A Dynamic Theory of Mediation Leverage

Leverage remains something that is assumed to be common knowledge. The use of leverage in mediation, as demonstrated in the previous section, is most often equated with material resources and military strength. I argue, however, that this vision of leverage reveals only a portion of the story. A reconceptualization of leverage is thus necessary to capture its dynamic properties. Leverage represents any means available to a mediator to influence the mediation process and to alter incentives for belligerents so

they may reach an agreement. A mediator's influence, though, cannot be assumed to correlate with resources only. Instead, a mediator's influence is a function of a number of properties of the mediator itself, both material and immaterial. Resources matter but they do not hold a monopoly on mediator leverage. Less tangible characteristics including but not limited to past interactions and personal ties give strength to a mediator vis-à-vis the mediation process as well. Thus, I contend that leverage can be conceptualized as an interaction between two different yet complimentary dimensions: capability and credibility. While each dimension contributes a unique set of skills that a mediator can use to help resolve a conflict, both play an important role in the hopes of achieving a lasting agreement.

Capability leverage corresponds closely with the traditional assumptions of leverage. Thus, this first dimension includes measures of influence such as wealth, military strength, and other material forms of coercive power. Capability leverage, to use the words of Beardsley (2008), is the tangible dimension of leverage. Capability is essential for a more nuanced notion of leverage for it captures what most scholars have been talking about with regards to leverage. Capability leverage contributes to a mediator's overall influence by giving that mediator the power to push negotiations, alter incentives of negotiating parties, and add security guarantees to mediation efforts.

Credibility leverage, on the other hand, refers to the influence that mediators have when they have a strong rapport with the belligerents. This second dimension of leverage is crucial in filling the void that prior mediation studies have left open. While most existing mediation studies consider leverage in terms of the first dimension - capability - few consider the influence of less material aspects of leverage. Psychological and/or personal connections between the belligerents and the mediator, however, can have incredible weight over the path of the mediation process. Credibility leverage is likely to influence the content of negotiations, the perceived commitment to the mediation process, and the efficacy of communication throughout the mediation. Thus, credibility leverage holds as much influence over a mediation attempt as does the traditional, tangible dimension of capability leverage; the influence, however, takes on a different

form. Studies, then, must account for both dimensions of leverage in order to fully comprehend the behavior of mediators and the effects their behavior has on mediation outcomes.

By giving distinct attention to both capability and credibility leverage, I am recognizing that there is no simple formula for leverage in mediation. Leverage is a dynamic concept and should be treated as such if it is to be used as a variable in studies of conflict mediation. I define each component of leverage below and further discuss why a more dynamic conceptualization of leverage is important for mediation research. Importantly, I consider which mediators are more likely to exert each dimension of leverage. I then move to a more substantively interesting discussion: how do capability and credibility leverage influence mediation outcomes?

Capability Leverage

Capability leverage is comprised of tangible dimensions that contribute to a mediator's power and strength. Similar to hard power (Nye 1990), capability leverage involves getting others to do what one wants through acts of coercion. In the context of mediation, then, this would be the use of a "big stick" to get an agreement signed. Mediators with capability leverage coerce negotiating parties to sign an agreement; as is discussed more fully in later sections, this coercion is often a quick yet insufficient solution to a conflict. Nye (2004) argues that hard power grows out of a country's military and economic might. Capability leverage, as conceptualized in this study, is also a function of economic and military power. I discuss each of these components of capability leverage in turn below.¹

¹In future extensions of this paper, I hope to include a political measure of capability leverage as well. At the current stage, I have been unable to access the necessary data to measure this dimension. Nevertheless, the political dimension of capability leverage is important because it refers to a mediator's political ability to take part in conflict mediation. Political capability encompasses the presence or absence of institutional structures that contribute expertise to mediation. Importantly, the political dimension of capability leverage acts as a proxy for whether or not a government or organization has the ability and know-how to engage in foreign affairs and to expend energy and resources on conflict mediation. This dimension of capability leverage empowers mediators insofar as it indicates their commitment to conflict mediation and their ability to direct resources abroad to broker peace between warring groups. On the surface, then, the economic and political components of capability leverage act as material mechanisms to shape the mediation process. Thus, there are clear theoretical justifications for including a political

Economic power, or wealth, contributes to a mediator's capability leverage. Wealth bestows upon mediators a broader or fancier "toolbox" for mediation. With economic power, mediators are simply more capable of mediating conflicts in terms of funding the process and maintaining a presence in the country for the duration of the mediation. More importantly, though, mediators with economic might are able to use carrots and sticks to expedite the mediation process. In other words, economic strength gives particular mediators the ability to shape the mediation process through their use of material incentives and/or sanctions.

The second dimension of capability leverage is comprised of a military dimension. Military strength is included under the broader category of capability leverage because it gives mediators the ability to enforce any agreement that is reached. In other words, military capability attaches a threat to mediation that alters incentives of belligerents to negotiate. A potential military presence will make an agreement more likely because it creates an environment where cheating will be less feasible and less likely. Mediators with military capability are able to use enforcement mechanisms to increase incentives for compliance and cooperation. Enforcement, as Beardsley writes, provides "another means of overcoming bargaining failures" (2011, 34). Attaching an enforcement mechanism to mediation not only deters belligerents from cheating in the negotiation process, but it also gives them confidence that the post-agreement reality will more or less reflect the terms of the agreement.

Capability leverage in mediation, with its economic and military dimensions, alters the costs of non-agreement and expands the number of mutually acceptable alternatives to fighting (Beardsley 2011, 31). The economic and military capabilities of the mediator, of course, are relative to those of the government participating in the civil conflict. Thus, capability leverage is not measured in absolute terms but is measured as a ratio of a mediator's leverage to that of the government. As such, a mediator's capability is not constant across time and space, but instead varies according to specific characteristics of the mediator itself. The contextual nature of capability leverage sets it apart from

dimension of capability leverage, however the empirical measures are not readily available.

traditional uses of leverage which treat the concept as static or constant.

Capability leverage, though, is merely one portion of the dynamic concept of leverage. By itself, capability leverage facilitates conflict mediation and increases the likelihood of conflict resolution, but it does not capture the full potential of mediation. The next section considers how less tangible and less material forms of influence contribute to credibility leverage.

Credibility Leverage

As aforementioned, leverage is not merely synonymous with material resources or power. Leverage is the ability of a mediator to influence a conflict and alter the incentives of warring parties so that they may reach a peaceful settlement. This influence contains immaterial characteristics of a mediator that nonetheless hold great weight during the mediation process. Credibility leverage, then, can be compared to Nye's conception of soft power (1990; 2004). Soft power occurs when one actor gets other actors to want what it wants (Nye 1990). More specifically, it involves "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments" (Nye 2004, 256). Like soft power, then, credibility leverage is an essential dimension of leverage because it gives mediators the ability to alter the course of negotiations. In using credibility leverage, mediators are able to increase the likelihood that belligerents will sign a lasting peace agreement. While not defined in terms of brute strength, the dimensions of credibility leverage are equally as important for mediation efforts than those of capability leverage.

Credibility leverage is a function of three concepts: mediators wield credibility leverage insofar as they have past historical ties to any of the belligerent parties, cultural ties to any (or all) of the warring groups, and/or they are able to offer post-agreement monitoring. The components of credibility leverage are highly context-dependent. In other words, not all mediators will have credibility leverage and not all mediators who have credibility leverage will have it in all situations. The characteristics of the mediator, the conflict, and the disputants all influence the presence or absence of credibility leverage in a given conflict. Again, the contextual nature of credibility leverage adds

even more weight to the dynamic conceptualization of leverage. Where previous studies glossed over the leverage of diverse mediator types, credibility leverage will capture both the intangible and the context-specific components of leverage.

Before discussing the dimensions of credibility leverage, I first want to acknowledge the role of bias in conflict mediation. The dimensions of credibility leverage overlap with proxies for bias, therefore one must consider how bias influences mediation. While there is an ongoing debate in existing literature, I argue that bias contributes to credibility leverage in that it gives mediators more influence over mediation outcomes. Kydd (2003) evaluates the role of bias in mediation, finding that biased mediators are more effective at conflict mediation than unbiased mediators. In his research, bias contributes to the credibility of a mediator insofar as a biased mediator is expected to contribute trustworthy information.² Svensson (2007a) also highlights the role of bias in conflict mediation, disaggregating biased mediation attempts that are on behalf of the government versus those that are rebel-biased. He finds that government-biased mediators have a positive effect on conflict mediation, predominantly because they mitigate commitment problems. Rebel-biased mediators, on the other hand, do not have a statistically significant impact on mediation. Savun (2008) also finds that biased mediators are more likely to be successful than unbiased mediators. Importantly, Savun posits that biased mediators are more likely to be able to persuade disputants to settle their disagreements without the use of force by the mediators (44).

In the following paragraphs, I describe the dimensions of credibility leverage and the ways in which they contribute to the overall leverage of a mediator. As previously mentioned, a number of the components that contribute to credibility leverage refer to bias, namely historical ties (which include past material bias) and cultural bias. In the same vein as Kydd (2003), Svensson (2007a), and Savun (2008), however, I argue that these dimensions will have a positive impact on civil war mediation efforts by mitigating

²In a later study, Kydd (2006) refines his evaluation of bias, stating that moderate levels of bias only contribute to mediation success in repeated interactions, where a mediator has already established a reputation. My conceptualization of credibility leverage, however, captures an environment of repeated interaction and thus controls for Kydd's revisions.

commitment problems and communicating information to combatants. Moreover, the dimensions of credibility leverage capture a component of leverage that is not based in material strength but instead in the quality of the relationships between mediators and disputants.

Past historical ties to the belligerent parties come in several forms. Colonial legacies, previous intervention into the conflict, and/or the provision of prior material support to any of the parties create ties between the mediator and the conflict. These ties build a rapport through which mediators can influence belligerents and shape the mediation environment. Specifically, having a history of interacting with a country, whether through colonial efforts or previous mediation attempts, serves as a signal that the mediator has an interest in the country. Similarly, past historical ties indicate that a mediator made some form of credible commitment to the country or group in question in the past. Given this past credible behavior, disputants can have a higher degree of confidence that the mediator will be more likely to be credible again in the future. Past historical commitments also increase the likelihood of providing information to the negotiating parties. Disputants can trust that mediators with past historical ties to their country, for better or worse, will be more likely to exert continued influence over mediation efforts than mediators with no historical ties.

Historical ties also involve the provision of material support to any of the belligerent groups prior to the conflict. This dimension is not the same as the material strength captured by capability leverage, because it does not involve the mediator using material might or carrots and sticks to influence the mediation efforts. Instead, past material support is an indicator of a form of bias. Again, bias increases the likelihood of successful mediation because it demonstrates a mediator who not only cares about ending hostilities but also about fully resolving the dispute in a way that matches the interests of one or more of the involved parties (Savun 2008).

Cultural ties, be they religious or ethnic, also serve to increase the credibility leverage of a mediator. Again, mediators with specific ties to the conflict or any of the warring parties will exert influence over the mediation efforts through their access to in-

formation and their perceived interest in the conflict. They will be able to alter the costs of settlement not through material means but through their cultural bias toward any of the belligerent groups. In other words, cultural bias is expected to make mediation more successful because belligerents will be able to trust that the mediator is both providing accurate information and genuinely committed to reaching a peaceful settlement. As such, mediators with cultural bias can be expected to exert credible influence over the mediation process.

The final dimension of credibility leverage focuses on the ability of a mediator to monitor and/or enforce an agreement. While some may say that monitoring and enforcement capabilities straddle the line between capability and credibility leverage, I argue that post-agreement assurances for involvement represent credibility leverage most fully. A mediator that holds the potential for continued monitoring following the signing of an agreement is a mediator that demonstrates commitment to the settlement and signals its interests in a more durable peace. According to Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, “The most effective means third parties can use to address the security fears of adversaries in the short run, though, is likely to be to promise to intervene to provide for the safety of the parties” (2001, 193). Walter (1997) also emphasizes the indispensable role of monitoring for civil war settlement. Mediators that have the potential for monitoring, then, will exert credibility leverage and increase the likelihood of a peaceful resolution to a civil war.

Before moving to a deeper evaluation of the dynamic conceptualization of leverage in civil war mediation, it is crucial to reiterate that both capability and credibility leverage are context dependent. Stating that leverage is contextual both adds to the dynamic nature of the concept and emphasizes that leverage is not constant for all mediators at all times. While the dimensions of capability leverage vary according to the relative economic and military strength of the mediator versus the government, credibility leverage varies along historical and cultural lines.

Applying Capability and Credibility Leverage to Civil War Mediation

Capability leverage encompasses economic and military influence while credibility leverage is a function of historical and cultural ties between the mediators and the disputants and the mediator's ability to monitor an agreement. With a clear conceptualization of leverage now established, I shift focus to the more interesting substantive puzzles. Which mediators are more likely to have the different dimensions of leverage, and more importantly, how does a dynamic conception of leverage influence the likelihood of mediation success?

Who has leverage?

Given the definitions of capability and credibility leverage, which mediators can be expected to exert leverage in conflict mediation efforts? The answer to this question is a bit more complex than earlier studies that equated material-based versions of leverage with great powers and other influential states and regarded all other mediators as having little to no leverage. I will take the components of leverage piece by piece to determine who has leverage in conflict mediation and what type of leverage they have. In particular, I fit great powers, regional powers, other states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and individuals into the dynamic leverage framework.³

Capability leverage, as a function of economic and military influence, is exerted most fully by great power states.⁴ These states have the economic standing needed to both fund mediation and extend carrots and sticks to put pressure on the mediation process. Lastly, they have the military might necessary to deter cheating and to guarantee enforcement. On this last dimension, the mere existence of a strong military serves to bolster capability leverage; whether or not the mediator will actually use its military is

³My future research plans include verifying these assumptions using the available data on civil war mediation and my construction of leverage variables. At this point, the dimensions of leverage are too disaggregated to reach conclusions.

⁴In our data, we define major powers according to the Correlates of War State System Membership List (COW 2011).

less important.

Other mediators that have access to capability leverage are, to a lesser extent, regional powers, neighboring states, and the United Nations. Regional powers, for example, may still have the economic clout necessary to influence the mediation process. Neighboring states may be able to take advantage of their geographic proximity to the conflict to overcome a lesser level of capability leverage. Neighboring states may not inherently be wealthy or powerful in a material sense, but their accessibility to the conflict will give them the ability to exert capability leverage over nearby conflicts. Moreover, neighbors will tend to feel a sense of urgency to mediate the conflict and prevent spillover effects; thus, neighbors will exert coercive measures and carrots and sticks to facilitate a negotiated settlement. In certain cases, the United Nations has both the economic resources and military influence to exert capability leverage as well. By stating that the UN has military strength, I am merely implying that the UN has peacekeeping forces that permit the organization to exert additional leverage over the mediation process.⁵

Smaller states, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and individuals are most likely to exert credibility leverage while mediating conflicts. These same actors, however, will not necessarily have access to capability leverage; their power is not tangible, yet it is still likely to contribute to mediation success. Credibility leverage is more context-dependent than capability leverage. Again, by context-dependent I mean that the historical ties and cultural ties of any given mediator to the conflict will depend precisely on the identities of the mediator and of the belligerents. A mediator may have credibility leverage in one conflict, but not another one. In spite of the more context-based nature of this dimension of leverage, credibility leverage still holds important influence over mediation outcomes.

There additionally exists an intersection between capability and credibility leverage. Great powers and other mediators who have capability leverage may also have credi-

⁵Because peacekeeping forces vary in the size and strength, their contribution to capability leverage is precarious. More often than not, then, peacekeepers will exert credibility leverage in displaying a commitment to conflict resolution rather than capability leverage through coercion.

bility leverage. For example, France would exert capability leverage as a great power and also exert credibility leverage when mediating disputes in former colonies. On the other hand, it is also possible for mediators to have neither capability nor credibility leverage. A small organization, for example, does not have capability leverage nor does it have credibility leverage in its first mediation attempt in a country with which it has no past interactions. Over time, however, repeated interactions may allow the small organization to develop credibility leverage. The dynamic conceptualization of leverage put forth in this paper, then, captures not only the diverse ways in which mediators can influence the mediation process, but it also accounts for the development of leverage over time.

Leverage and Mediation Success

With the dynamic concept of leverage now defined, I explore the second, and more important theoretical question: how does leverage influence the likelihood of mediation success? In other words, in what ways do capability and credibility leverage affect mediation outcomes? For purposes of this paper, success is defined in two ways. First, short-term success is defined as the mediator's ability to achieve an agreement. Second, success is defined in terms of the duration of peace following a civil war. Thus, success is more than just reaching an agreement but also finding a settlement that lasts. Below, I consider the ways in which mediators' capability and credibility leverage alter both the likelihood of reaching an agreement and achieving a durable settlement.

How do great powers, regional powers, and other mediators with capability leverage influence mediation outcomes? Capability leverage, as a function of wealth and military capacity, gives mediators the coercive power necessary to force and/or expedite an agreement. More specifically, however, capability leverage shapes mediation outcomes in two specific ways: by altering the bargaining range and helping disputants overcome commitment problems. Importantly, though, these two mechanisms increase the likelihood of short-term success but are not expected to have long-term beneficial effects.

The first causal mechanism that links capability leverage in mediation to negotiated settlements relates to bargaining in mediation. Capability leverage alters the bargaining range for negotiating parties, specifically by expanding the acceptable range of agreements. With capability leverage, mediators are able to use carrots and sticks to “increase the opportunity costs of conflict...the most intrusive mediators can expand the number of peaceful alternative outcomes that are mutually preferable to conflict” (Beardsley 2011, 32). As the bargaining range expands through the use of capability leverage, an agreement becomes more likely. The use of carrots and sticks, however, does not guarantee an increased likelihood of reaching an agreement that lasts.⁶

Second, capability leverage increases the likelihood of achieving an agreement following a civil war by helping belligerents overcome commitment problems that traditionally undermine negotiations and/or lead to the resumption of war. If mediators have capability leverage, they have the economic and military capabilities necessary to prevent cheating during negotiations and assure enforcement of agreement implementation.⁷ As Beardsley (2011) writes, implementation assistance increases the costs of both cheating and reneging on an agreement. Moreover, capability leverage may assuage the vulnerability certain belligerents may feel in signing an agreement. Thus, capability leverage both increases the bargaining range and mitigates commitment problems. This reasoning leads to my first hypothesis:

***Hypothesis 1:** All else equal, capability leverage will render mediators more likely to achieve short-term success in the form of a negotiated settlement.*

Credibility leverage is expected to affect the mediation process in different ways than capability leverage. Credibility leverage, being based upon historical and cultural ties and the possibility of monitoring, is lacking in the carrots and sticks or coercive

⁶Svensson (2007b) suggests this idea, stating that mediators who rely on coercion and carrots and sticks “do not have the resources to address the root-causes of conflicts...” (233). Credibility leverage, on the other hand, fosters information and commitment in ways that facilitate more lasting agreements.

⁷Whether or not mediators with capability leverage actually enforce an agreement may not be important; the perception that enforcement is possible may alter belligerents behavior and coerce cooperation.

power that one sees with capability leverage. Nonetheless, credibility leverage is expected to lead to more successful mediation outcomes. In other words, credibility leverage is expected to lead to outcomes of more durable peace. Credibility leverage influences mediation outcomes by signaling a mediator's commitment to long-term success and by facilitating an exchange of credible information.

Because credibility leverage captures a mediator's specific historic and/or cultural ties to a conflict, disputants have reason to believe that the mediator's motives are genuine. The mediator with credibility leverage is not merely trying to strike a bargain at any cost; rather, credibility leverage indicates vested interests in a conflict that allow the mediator to foster an environment of cooperation and demonstrate a commitment to a durable peace. In other words, credibility leverage signals that a mediator has interests in the country and is committed to maintaining a relationship with the country. The peacekeeping potential of certain mediators further bolsters this mechanism by offering assurances of longer-term support.

When mediators rely on credibility leverage, they pursue communication-facilitation strategies in lieu of manipulative or directive strategies, to use the terminology of Bercovitch and Houston (2000). Communication-facilitation strategies do not depend on the use of carrots and sticks but rather, they emphasize the role that communication and cooperation can play in the dispute settlement process. Through communication, information is exchanged and social ties are likely to be strengthened. Information provision will serve to assuage bargaining failures. Moreover, the information provision role of credibility leverage sets it apart from its capability counterpart. While capability leverage uses coercion to reach an agreement and thus leaves much information undisclosed or private, credibility leverage works to get as much information on the table as possible. Mediators with historical and cultural ties will inherently have more information about the conflict and at least one of the warring sides from the very beginning. Moreover, the slower deliberation of mediation under credibility leverage will lead to more information being revealed before an agreement is signed. Through commitment and information mechanisms, mediators with credibility leverage are expected to have

a positive effect on mediation success. Hypotheses 2a and 2b summarize the expected relationship:

Hypothesis 2a: *A mediator with credibility leverage is expected to have no effect on the initial signing of an agreement.*

Hypothesis 2b: *Credibility leverage, however, will render mediators more likely to achieve a more durable peace following a settlement.*

Thus far, I have treated capability and credibility leverage in isolation. A number of mediators, however, have both forms of leverage; the categories of leverage are not mutually exclusive. Given the previous theories and hypotheses, I argue that possessing both capability and credibility leverage will make a mediator more effective at conflict mediation than other mediators. In other words, a mediator with the entire leverage package will be more likely to both achieve a settlement and have that settlement last. Table 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships between capability and credibility leverage and mediation outcomes.

TABLE 1: The Effect of Leverage on Mediation

	Agreement Signed	Agreement Lasts
Capability	✓	
Credibility		✓
Both	✓	✓

Data and Research Design

This study focuses on building a more dynamic concept of leverage and testing its effects on civil war mediation outcomes. The two components of leverage - capability and credibility - are expected to have positive albeit unique effects on the likelihood and nature of post-war settlements. To test the hypotheses regarding mediator leverage and civil war resolution, I utilize the universe of civil war mediation attempts from 1989 through 2006 as identified by the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen,

Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011). The CWM data serves as a starting point for a larger data project on mediation leverage. For each mediator within the dataset, I add specific characteristics to capture leverage.⁸ The data is then aggregated at the mediation attempt level to assess the overall levels of leverage in each mediation attempt. My unit of analysis, then, is mediation attempt with a conflict dyad. A number of conflicts have multiple mediation attempts within a single year. For example, Rwanda experienced three distinct mediation attempts in 1991 and five attempts in 1992, as determined by the mediation start and end dates provided by the CWM dataset.⁹

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable of interest in this study is mediation success. Success, however, is a term with many meanings within the civil war resolution literature. For purposes of this study I operationalize mediation success in two specific ways. First, I consider whether or not an agreement was signed following mediation efforts and if so, which type of agreement was signed. Second, success is operationalized as the quality or duration of an agreement.

The first dimension of success refers to both the signing of an agreement and the level of the agreement. The mediation outcome is operationalized as an ordered variable with the following categories: (1) the mediation attempt failed and did not result in any agreement; (2) the parties signed either a ceasefire or a peace process agreement; (3) the parties reached a partial agreement; and (4) the mediation resulted in a full and comprehensive peace agreement. Data for this variable comes from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset version 2.0 (Högbladh 2011). Using an ordered variable allows for a more nuanced understanding of the effects of certain types of mediation leverage. In

⁸The data for this paper is part of a broader project on leverage and bias in civil war mediation that I have been working on with Elizabeth Menninga. I want to express my gratitude to her and my enthusiasm about being a part of this bigger project on leverage, bias, and mediation.

⁹The number of mediators per mediation attempt ranges from one to nine. The aggregation of mediator leverage within these attempts provides a tougher test of my hypotheses. Using the mediation attempt rather than the individual mediator as unit of analysis, however, is essential in order to acknowledge that multiple mediators within one mediation attempt are not acting independently from one another.

this vein, the disaggregation of agreement types recognizes that not all agreements are equal; partial or process agreements should not be treated in the same outcome category as comprehensive peace agreements.

To assess the effects of mediator leverage on this first dimension of success, the occurrence and type of an agreement, I utilize an ordered logit model. An ordered logit model assesses the effects of explanatory variables across the ordered categories of the dependent variable, in this case the mediation outcome. Mediation outcome is an ordered dependent variable in the sense that the four outcome categories have a distinct hierarchy where a failed mediation attempt is the worst and comprehensive peace agreement is the best. Ordered logit models are restricted by the assumption that all predictors have a uniform effect on the outcome categories; I test for this assumption and consider its implications in the results section.

Second, mediation success is operationalized using a duration variable. Duration measures how long, in months, a negotiated settlement lasts. While signing an agreement is an important step, mediation truly becomes meaningful when it achieves a peace that lasts and facilitates an end to the conflict trap. The duration variable is also derived from UCDP's Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011).

Because the second dependent variable is a duration variable, I use a Cox proportional hazards model to analyze the expected relationships between mediation leverage and peace duration following an agreement. As an event history model, the Cox model assesses the hazard of peace failing at any given time. The Cox model is also a prudent choice in order to avoid the inefficiencies that arise when one makes incorrect assumptions about the baseline hazard, because the Cox model leaves the baseline hazard function unspecified. Moreover, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) write that "there are few instances that we can think of where one would naturally prefer a parametric duration model over a Cox-type event history model" in social science research (66). From the Cox model, I will be able to determine the survival of peace given the specified covariates.

Explanatory Variables: Operationalizing Leverage

Staying true to the theoretical model outlined above, leverage is operationalized as a dynamic concept that is comprised of both capability dimensions and credibility dimensions. As such, different mediators bring different forms of leverage to the mediation table. Capability leverage, defined in terms of a mediator's economic and military strength, allows a mediator to utilize carrots and sticks or coercion to achieve a settlement between warring factions. I operationalize capability leverage following two dimensions: economic and military capability.

First, capability leverage is measured in terms of economic power. As is mentioned earlier, wealth bestows upon mediators a broader "toolbox" for mediation, and it gives them the ability to utilize carrots and sticks to expedite and shape the mediation process. I operationalize the economic dimension of capability leverage using a country's gross domestic product as derived from the Penn World Table (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002).¹⁰ In using GDP to measure capability leverage, I exclude non-country mediators from having this dimension of leverage. This decision, though, is warranted in the sense that non-state mediators will not have the economic capacity to shape the mediation process using material incentives and/or punishments. The exception to this exclusion is the United Nations. Given the size and scope of the UN, I have included their annual budget in constant 2005 US dollars to capture their economic capability in comparison to that of states (Hufner 2013).

The second dimension of capability leverage focuses on the military strength of a country. As the theoretical framework of this paper suggests, military might offers the potential for enforcement of any agreement that is reached. Moreover, military capability strengthens a mediator's coercive power.¹¹ This aspect of capability leverage is

¹⁰The GDP of mediators and states is measured in the mediation start year as purchasing power parity converted GDP per capita in constant 2005 US dollars. GDP per capita is then multiplied by population to gain overall GDP measures for each country.

¹¹It is important to note that leverage here is not tied to the use of military strength. Instead, if the belligerents perceive that a mediator has a strong military, the mediator is thus enabled to utilize more coercive means at the bargaining table.

measured utilizing the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset, version 3.02 (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). CINC is an index that captures a country's total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure. Again, only country mediators have a CINC score, thus non-state mediators do not have access to this dimension of capability leverage. Certain non-state mediators do, however, have the capacity deploy peacekeepers or other monitoring forces; this is captured in measures of credibility leverage.

To deal with the contextual nature of capability leverage, I use relative scores of GDP and CINC. In other words, the covariates for GDP and CINC are relative measures of a mediator's wealth and military capabilities in comparison to those of the government taking part in the negotiations. Using a relative measure for both dimensions of capability leverage recognizes that a mediator with a high GDP, for example, will not have as much leverage if it is mediating a conflict in a country that has a similarly high GDP.¹²

In contrast to capability leverage, credibility leverage represents the less tangible ways in which mediators alter incentives and generate peace agreements. Rather than relying on coercion, credibility leverage shapes the course of mediation efforts by signaling a mediator's will or interest in achieving peace. Thus, credibility leverage focuses more on communication and commitment than it does on carrots and sticks. As is aforementioned, a mediator wields this form of leverage if she has historical and/or cultural ties to the conflict at hand.

Historical ties to a conflict entail a number of dimensions. First, mediators have historical ties to a conflict if they have a colonial legacy in the country at war or if they

¹²The relative CINC score is measured by dividing the maximum CINC score of all mediators in the mediation attempt by the CINC of the government of the warring country. The same process is used to calculate relative GDP. Because the unit of analysis is mediation attempt, the analysis is complicated by the presence of multiple mediators in a mediation attempt. I thus utilize the maximum values of both CINC and GDP from all the mediators present in the conflict. I choose the maximum values because they are most representative of the overall capability leverage in the mediation attempt. The presence of mediators with lower GDPs or CINC scores should not undermine the leverage of the stronger mediators in any way.

have past interventions in the country at war. Historical ties is a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if a mediator meets one or more of the following criteria: (1) previous mediation in the conflict; (2) colonial power in the country of the mediation attempt; (3) Russia mediating a conflict in a former Soviet state. Data for previous mediation attempts is provided by the CWM dataset, while data on colonial powers and Soviet states is derived from the CIA World Factbook (CIA 2013). To deal with the presence of multiple mediators in any given mediation attempt, the variable measures the combined or aggregate history of the mediators. Combined history is coded as 1 if any of the mediators present have a history with the conflict.

The second dimension of a mediator's historical ties to a conflict is material in nature. Material bias influences mediation outcomes insofar as it indicates a mediator's commitment to one or more sides in the conflict. Material bias is not a measure of the ability to offer carrots and sticks; instead, it captures a mediator's interests and commitment. I operationalize material bias as a dichotomous measure. A mediator is coded as having material bias if she has given aid to the government prior to the commencement of mediation and/or given aid to the rebel group(s) prior to the mediation efforts.¹³ I use UCDP's External Support dataset to determine whether or not material support was given to government and/or the rebels (Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér 2011).¹⁴ Again, where multiple mediators are present in a single mediation attempt, the variable is coded as 1 as long as one mediator has provided material support to one or more of the negotiating parties.

Cultural bias is another dimension of credibility leverage that is used to capture a mediator's potential influence over the settlement process. Cultural bias is defined by ethnic and/or religious ties and is expected to make mediation efforts more successful through commitment and credibility mechanisms. A mediator has cultural bias if he has

¹³In coding material bias, only aid to the specific rebel group(s) in the mediation attempt was recorded. Aid to other rebel groups in the country is not coded as bias for the mediation attempt in question.

¹⁴UCDP disaggregates the type of external support and whether or not it was confirmed or alleged support. For the purposes of this study, I look at both alleged and confirmed support of any type that was given within the ten years prior to the mediation effort.

any ethnic ties or shared religious identities with the disputants.¹⁵ In mediation attempts where at least one mediator has ties with any of the negotiating parties, the variable for cultural bias is coded as 1.

Finally, credibility leverage involves a mediator's ability to monitor the implementation of an agreement. As such, a peacekeeping variable is included in the models. This variable is operationalized according to a mediator's potential to send a peacekeeping force. If a mediator has deployed peacekeepers in the past, then it is coded as having the ability to send them in the future. The ability to send peacekeeping forces underlines the commitment and thus the credibility leverage a mediator has over the mediation process. Again, peacekeeping potential is aggregated within each mediation attempt. Peacekeeping potential is coded 0 if no mediator in a mediation attempt has peacekeepers at its disposal and 1 if any mediator within an attempt has the potential to send either civilian forces, military observers, or military troops.¹⁶

Control Variables

The analysis includes a range of common control variables from the civil war resolution literature. I control for conflict duration as measured in years from the start of the conflict to the signing of an agreement. Conflict duration is expected to be positively correlated with the probability of a settlement (Mason and Fett 1996). Data on civil war duration comes from the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). Conflict intensity serves as an additional control variable. Using the Uppsala Conflict Database Categorical Variables dataset (UCDP 2009), conflict intensity is operationalized as either a minor conflict (25 to 999 battle deaths) or a war (1000 or more battle deaths).¹⁷ The intensity of the conflict is determined

¹⁵Data for the cultural bias variables is derived from a number of sources. These include: the Minorities at Risk Project (2009), the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset (Asal, Pate and Wilkenfeld 2008), and the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman, Min and Wimmer 2009).

¹⁶Data for this variable is from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (Soder 2012).

¹⁷There is also a third category in our dataset, coded 0, that indicates no ongoing conflict in the year of the mediation.

at the dyad level and measured in the start year of the mediation attempt. The literature widely recognizes the relationship between conflict intensity and the likelihood of reaching a settlement, although the direction of this relationship remains uncertain.¹⁸ Zartman (2001) states that high intensity conflicts will create fear and animosity and thus reduce the likelihood of an agreement, while Mason and Fett (1996) assert that higher intensity conflicts should accelerate the signing of an agreement. Third, I control for the incompatibility driving the conflict. The incompatibility control records whether a conflict is over a territory, control of the government, or both, coded 1, 2, and 3 respectively (UCDP 2009).¹⁹ According to Toft (2004), territorial conflicts will be more difficult to settle. Finally, I control for the presence of peacekeepers in the country using a dichotomous variable which is coded 1 if there were peacekeepers present in a country during a mediation effort and 0 otherwise (Soder 2012). Importantly, this control is not measuring the presence of peacekeeping forces following an agreement, only those that were deployed before the mediation ended.

Results

I present the coefficients and their standard errors for the ordered logit models in Table 2. Because relative GDP and relative CINC scores are correlated (correlation = 0.672), the two variables are included in separate models to avoid multicollinearity problems. Model 1 reports the effects of the independent variables, excluding relative CINC scores, on mediation outcomes. The base category of the ordered outcome variable is mediation failure, the second represents a ceasefire or peace process agreement, the third indicates that the parties reached a partial agreement and finally, the fourth category is that the mediators facilitated a comprehensive peace agreement.

¹⁸This intensity variable is suboptimal to more nuanced intensity measures that use cumulative battle deaths. Given current data availability, I would not be able to have data on cumulative battle deaths for conflicts beginning prior to 1989. Future extensions of this work will seek to ameliorate this deficiency.

¹⁹There are no occurrences of a conflict that is both territorial and over central control of the government in our data.

TABLE 2: Ordered Logit: Leverage and Mediation Outcomes

	Model 1	Model 2
<u>Capability Leverage</u>		
Relative GDP	0.0002 (0.0002)	
Relative CINC		0.002 * (0.001)
<u>Credibility Leverage</u>		
Material Bias	-0.433 (0.274)	-0.444 (0.274)
Cultural Bias	0.332 (0.326)	0.249 (0.323)
Historical Ties	0.055 (0.250)	0.001 (0.249)
PKO Potential	-0.346 (0.239)	-0.380 (0.241)
<u>Controls</u>		
PKO during mediation	0.802 *** (0.261)	0.768 *** (0.261)
Intensity	0.072 (0.192)	0.113 (0.190)
Incompatibility	0.702 *** (0.238)	0.662 *** (0.236)
Conflict Duration	-0.016 ** (0.007)	-0.012 (0.007)
<i>N</i>	320	318
Pseudo R^2	0.037	0.034
$\log L$	-402.734	-403.098

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$

Model 1 reveals that relative GDP has a positive effect on mediation outcomes, meaning that as relative GDP increases or as the mediator exerts greater capability leverage, a more comprehensive agreement becomes more likely. However, the coefficient does not attain statistical significance thus I cannot assert with confidence that this economic dimension of capability leverage fulfills the theory. Credibility leverage is predicted by hypothesis 2 to have no effect on the likelihood of initial success, or no effect on the signing of an agreement. Fittingly, none of the credibility leverage measures reach statistical significance. The coefficients for material bias and peacekeeping potential in Model 1 reveal that a mediator who has material bias or the ability to offer monitoring renders a more comprehensive agreement less likely, all else being equal.

Again, this relationship does not reach any level of statistical significance. Both cultural bias and historical ties, as dimensions of credibility leverage, are not expected to influence initial mediation outcomes in any significant way. While both variables have positive effects on reaching a more comprehensive agreement, they are not statistically significant.

With regards to the control variables in Model 1, mediation efforts with peacekeepers present experience a 0.802 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of achieving a more comprehensive settlement, while all other variables are held constant. This finding is significant at the $p=.01$ level. The type of incompatibility has a statistically significant and positive effect on mediation outcomes as well, while conflict duration renders a more comprehensive agreement less likely. Finally, intensity does not have a statistically significant effect on the nature of a post-civil war settlement.²⁰

Referring to Model 2 in Table 2, one can see that the relative CINC score, a proxy for capability leverage, has a positive and statistically significant effect on mediation outcomes. In other words, a one unit increase in the relative CINC score of a mediator results in a 0.002 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of achieving a more comprehensive peace agreement. In short, mediators with military capability increase the likelihood of moving from no agreement to more complete settlements. The remaining variables in the model maintain similar effects on mediation outcomes as they do in Model 1, with one exception. The control for conflict duration no longer attains statistical significance, though it has a negative effect on the achievement of an agreement following a civil war.

The marginal effects of capability leverage on agreement outcomes are given in Figures 1 and 2 in the appendix. Both figures reveal that, as relative CINC scores and relative GDP move from their minimum values to their maximum values, the probability of reaching a full settlement during a mediation attempt increases by approximately 0.5. The plots are substantively interesting in that they demonstrate a strong tendency

²⁰This last finding is likely accounted for by the rudimentary measure of intensity being used. Future data collection will seek to ameliorate this shortcoming.

of mediators with capability leverage to achieve a full agreement versus other types of agreements. This finding is promising for the initial establishment of peace following a civil war. Questions arise, however, regarding the durability of these full agreements.²¹

An ordered logit model operates under the assumption that all independent variables have a uniform effect across each response category. In the case of this paper, this requirement would mean that each predictor has the same coefficients for predicting failed agreements, ceasefire or process agreements, partial agreements, and full agreements. The proportional odds assumption, however, is frequently violated. Given the risk of violating the proportional odds assumption, I perform the Brant test following the ordered logit regression. The Brant test is superior to standard post-estimation analyses of the proportional odds assumption in that it provides both an overall test of whether or not the model violates the assumption, and it also tests the assumption for each variable individually. Neither Model 1 nor Model 2 fulfills the proportional odds assumption, but upon closer inspection, the only individual variable in violation is incompatibility. Given the isolated nature of the violation, I remain inclined to report the ordered logit results with confidence.²²

In sum, the results from the ordered logit models weakly support hypotheses 1 and 2a. Capability leverage, as measured by the relative CINC scores of the mediator versus the government at the negotiating table, is the only one of the leverage variables to have a statistically significant effect on the signing of an agreement. While relative GDP is not significant, I can nevertheless conclude that capability leverage plays an important role in making a peace agreement more likely. Hypothesis 2a suggests that the relationship between credibility leverage and reaching an agreement is null. Credibility leverage, however, becomes important for ensuring the durability of an agreement. Again, the results of the ordered logit models support this null hypothesis as well.

²¹In calculating the marginal effects of relative GDP and relative CINC, material bias, cultural bias, combined history, peacekeeping potential were held at their mode, current PKOs was held at 1, and all other variables were held at their means.

²²I have run a number of alternative models to correct for the violation of the proportional odds assumption. The results remain consistent with those of Model 1 and Model 2, further indicating that the violation of the proportional odds assumption is trivial with these model specifications.

Table 3 presents the results for the survival analyses of mediator leverage and the duration of post-civil war settlements. The models report the coefficients for the Cox proportional hazards test. Positive values of a coefficient indicate a higher likelihood of failure, where failure in this case indicates war resumption. In other words, variables with a positive coefficient contribute to a higher likelihood that peace will fail following an agreement. Conversely, negative coefficients represent a lower likelihood of failure, or a more durable peace.^{23 24}

TABLE 3: Cox Proportional Hazards Models: Leverage and Duration of Settlements

	Model 3	Model 4
Capability Leverage		
Relative GDP	0.0005** (0.0002)	
Relative CINC		0.004* (0.002)
Credibility Leverage		
Material Bias	-1.568** (0.762)	-1.201* (0.668)
Cultural Bias	0.568 (1.096)	0.680 (1.102)
Historical Ties	0.617 (1.220)	-0.466 (0.857)
PKO Potential	1.334 (0.963)	1.132 (0.958)
Controls		
PKO during mediation	0.081 (0.636)	0.627 (0.631)
Intensity	-1.198** (0.580)	-0.631 (0.538)
Incompatibility	-0.833 (0.767)	-0.603 (0.753)
Conflict Duration	-0.030 (0.031)	-0.018 (0.028)
<i>N</i>	116	118
<i>log L</i>	-44.484	-45.107

Coefficients for Cox model reported; standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$

²³ An alternative presentation of the results would show hazard rates, or the hazard of peace failure. Both coefficients and hazard rates, while interpreted in different manners, yield the same results.

²⁴ The Cox proportional hazard models conform to the proportional hazards assumption.

Model 3 tests the effects of mediation leverage on the peace duration following a civil war, including the relative GDP variable. Relative GDP has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, thus a mediator's economic capability is expected to render peace more likely to fail following an agreement. This finding supports the theoretical expectations in that capability leverage is mainly expected to facilitate the signing of an agreement, not the duration of peace following that agreement. Material bias, as a proxy for credibility leverage, has a coefficient of -1.568; this effect is statistically significant at the $p=.05$ level. Mediation attempts with material bias, then, will make peace endure longer than those without material bias, all else being equal.

While the result for material bias generates support for my hypotheses, the other dimensions of credibility leverage do not offer equally optimistic results. The coefficients for cultural bias, historical ties, and peacekeeping potential are 0.568, 0.617, and 1.334, respectively. The positive coefficients, again, indicate that these variables reduce the duration of peace following a negotiated settlement. These results, however, are not statistically significant. For the control variables, only intensity attains statistical significance; more intense civil conflicts are expected to have a more durable peace following an agreement, holding all other variables constant. Incompatibility and conflict duration also have negative coefficients, thus contributing to longer peace survival times. Peacekeeping presence during mediation does not increase the likelihood of peace survival. These three control variables, however, are not statistically significant.

Finally, Model 4 assesses the role of a mediator's leverage on peace duration with relative CINC scores in lieu of relative GDP. Relative CINC has a coefficient of 0.004 and is statistically significant at the $p=.10$ level. As the relative CINC score between the mediator and the warring government increases, the likelihood of peace failing increases. This is consistent both with the effects of capability leverage in Model 3 and with the hypotheses. Material bias, as in Model 3, has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. Thus, material bias renders the post-conflict peace more likely to last. The remainder of the variables, both the credibility leverage covariates and the controls, have similar effects in Model 4 as they do in Model 3. There is one excep-

tion to this, however; historical ties within this model specification have a coefficient of -0.466. In other words, historical ties between a mediator and a belligerent group increase the duration of peace, all else being equal. The effect does not attain statistical significance.

Figures 3 and 4 in the appendix graph the expected survival time of peace following a negotiated settlement. As the hypotheses state, credibility leverage is expected to have a positive effect on long-term success following mediation efforts. Figure 3, then, compares material bias, the statistically significant dimension of credibility leverage, to relative CINC. With these plots, I can assess the relative effects of the two variables on mediation success. The graph suggests that credibility leverage as measured by material bias leads to a longer duration of peace following settlement than the proxies of capability leverage. Moreover, there is a stark drop in peace survival time when relative CINC is at its maximum value. The same findings hold true in Figure 4 with regards to material bias and relative GDP. Material bias leads to longer survival times than both relative CINC and relative GDP. The expected survival times confirm that credibility leverage is indeed a powerful tool for mediators who hope to achieve lasting peace.

The Cox proportional hazards results offer initial support for my hypotheses. More specifically, both models indicate that at least one dimension of credibility leverage, material bias, leads to a more durable peace. Thus, a mediator with credibility leverage may not have an effect on the initial signing of an agreement, but the mediator is able to contribute to a lasting peaceful outcome. Additionally, the Cox results suggest that mediators with capability leverage do not necessarily lead to long-term successful outcomes. Instead, capability leverage may actually degrade the probability of a more durable peace.

Conclusions

How do different mediator types influence mediation outcomes and the likelihood of a lasting peace following a negotiated settlement? In assessing the effects of mediators, it is crucial to acknowledge that not all mediators are created equally. The size, scope, strength, and resources of conflict mediators vary greatly. What Norway can do to mediate a conflict cannot be thought of as synonymous to what Jimmy Carter can do. In other words, different types of mediators wield different mediation “tools.” In spite of the variation in mediator types, the extant literature has done little to explore the diverse sources of leverage wielded by different mediators. This study has filled that blatant gap in existing research by seeking to investigate a dynamic notion of mediation leverage.

While the discussion of leverage in conflict mediation is not entirely novel, the dynamic model of leverage presented here strengthens existing work and will allow for the development of novel insights regarding mediator characteristics and mediation outcomes. The statistical analysis provides support for the idea that different types of leverage have different effects on mediation outcomes. Thus, scholarly work in civil war mediation can no longer discount the role of those “weak” mediators that do not hold the power of coercion. Each type of mediator has its own important role in civil war mediation.

Leverage, in its dynamic form, is a function of both capability and credibility. While capability involves economic and material measures of influence, credibility leverage captures the less tangible forms of influence such as historical ties, material and cultural bias, and the desire to offer monitoring following an agreement. Within this theoretical framework, mediators with capability leverage are expected to facilitate the signing of an agreement and mediators with credibility leverage are expected to facilitate a more durable peace following a settlement. Using the universe of mediation attempts from 1989 through 2006 as specified by DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011), I found initial support for my theory of mediation leverage.

This study is an exploration into a richer, more dynamic conceptualization of lever-

age, both theoretically and empirically. While I have found support for my theory of leverage and civil war mediation, there remains much work to be done. First, I hope to incorporate a political dimension into capability leverage. A political capability measure would strengthen the concept of capability leverage, and it would give due credit to those large intergovernmental organizations or regional powers that have the political know-how and ability to broker peace between belligerent groups. The second and larger task in ameliorating the dynamic theory of leverage is to consider how to aggregate the individual parts of capability and credibility leverage empirically. In its current form, the models treat each component as independent. I would like to explore how material bias, cultural bias, and historical ties, for example, can be aggregated using factor analysis to form one distinct measure of credibility leverage. This process would create more parsimonious measures of leverage that could then be used within other studies.

Finally, beyond the theoretical and empirical developments offered in this work, the discussion of capability and credibility leverage has important policy implications as well. Given the unique effects of capability versus credibility leverage, it is evident that different types of mediators have different effects on mediation outcomes. Thus, the mediation selection process should include some consideration of the effects of different types of leverage. To achieve a lasting peace, the international community must ensure that they are using the right tool for the job at hand.

APPENDIX




FIG. 1: Marginal Effects of Relative GDP on Civil War Settlement




FIG. 2: Marginal Effects of Relative CINC on Civil War Settlement




FIG. 3: Expected Survival Time of Peace - Material Bias vs. Relative CINC




FIG. 4: Expected Survival Time of Peace - Material Bias vs. Relative GDP

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